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Abstract: In the context of new threats to Public Key Cryptography arising from a growing
computational power both in classic and in quantum worlds, we present a new group law defined
on a subset of the projective plane FP2 over an arbitrary field F, which lends itself to applications
in Public Key Cryptography and turns out to be more efficient in terms of computational resources.
In particular, we give explicitly the number of base field operations needed to perform the mentioned
group law. Based on it, we present a Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement protocol. We analyze the
computational difficulty of solving the mathematical problem underlying the proposed Abelian
group law and we prove that the security of our proposal is equivalent to the discrete logarithm
problem in the multiplicative group of the cubic extension of the finite field considered. We present
an experimental setup in order to show real computation times along a comparison with the group
operation in the group of points of an elliptic curve. Based on current state-of-the-art algorithms, we
provide parameter ranges suitable for real world applications. Finally, we present a promising variant
of the proposed group law, by moving from the base field F to the ring Z/pqZ, and we explain how
the security becomes enhanced, though at the cost of a longer key length.
Keywords: abelian group law; discrete logarithm problem; norm of an extension; projective
cubic curve
MSC: Primary 20K01; Secondary 12F05; 14H50; 15A04; 68Q25; 94A60
1. Introduction and Related Work
Neal Koblitz [1] and Victor Miller [2] presented independently but simultaneously proposals
that made use of the multiplicative group of a finite field in order to implement certain asymmetric
cryptosystems. Koblitz presented an implementation of Diffie-Hellman key-agreement protocol [3]
based on the use of elliptic curves. On his part, Miller offered a proposal more on the theoretical side,
avoiding comparisons with existing implementations. In all those cases, the security is based on
the infeasibility of the discrete logarithm problem over elliptic curves (ECDLP), which is to this day
considered as difficult as the integer factorization problem (IFP), upon which RSA [4] cryptosystem is
based, or the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) employed in ElGamal cryptosystem [5].
Diffie-Hellman key-agreement protocol for elliptic curves (ECDH) consists essentially in mapping
the operations customarily carried out in the multiplicative group Z∗p to the set of points of an elliptic
curve, endowed with an additive group operation. However, this protocol painfully succumbs
in the face of a plain man-in-the-middle attack and, for this reason, Menezes, Qu, and Vanstone
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proposed [6] an authenticated variant, known as Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone key agreement
protocol (ECMQV). In general, the outcome of these key-agreement protocols is that the users
eventually share a value—the key or a seed to derive the key—which was initially unknown for
any of them, and cannot be inferred (more precisely: It is computationally infeasible to infer it) from
the information exchanged between the parties.
Along with these key-agreement protocols, several elliptic-curve-based asymmetric cryptosystems
have seen the light in these last years. The first proposals of the so-called elliptic-curve cryptosystems
(ECC) were revisions adapted from existing systems, such as ElGamal’s [5], or Massey-Omura’s [7].
They were publicized by Koblitz in [1].
The problem with the elliptic-curve version of ElGamal’s and Massey-Omura’s cryptosystems is
that the user needs to map each possible message to a point of the curve. This fact is an important
drawback since, on the one hand, the cardinal of the curve points is finite, so the user is limited to a
finite number of possible messages; and, on the other hand, the user needs some kind of “equivalence
table” between messages and points in order to cipher and decipher. Therefore, these cryptosystems
are limited in practice to those settings in which the set of possible messages is fixed in advance.
In order to overcome these limitations, Menezes and Vanstone proposed in [8] the Elliptic
Curve Menezes-Vanstone cryptosystem (ECMV) for elliptic curves over finite fields Fq. In ECMV,
each message is represented by elements of the Cartesian product F∗q × F∗q , not necessarily points of
the elliptic curve. The protocol includes a systematic procedure to divide any message into blocks and
to codify each block as an element of the Cartesian product. The downside is that ciphertext length
depends entirely on plaintext length.
In spite of the efforts, ECC has abandoned the battlefield of cryptosystems in favor of
key-agreement protocols as a building block for hybrid cryptosystems. In the latter, ECC permits the
users to share a session (ephemeral) key, whence a symmetric key is derived to be used together with a
symmetric cryptosystem, such as AES.
In this setting, Mihir Bellare and Philip Rogaway [9] published in 1997 the Discrete Logarithm
Augmented Encryption Scheme (DLAES). Along with Michel Abdalla, the system was improved
in 1998 by the same authors, and renamed as DHAES (Diffie-Hellman Augmented Encryption
Scheme) [10]. Eventually renamed to DHIES (Diffie-Hellman Integrated Encryption Scheme) [11,12],
it is an improved extension of ElGamal’s cryptosystem [5]. DHIES is really a complex protocol,
much more involved than ElGamal or Koblitz’s proposal in [1], which includes public key operations,
symmetric ciphering, authentication and hash function computation. While ElGamal and Koblitz
directly ciphered a message, without any further use of other necessary elements for a proper integrated
scheme, DHIES provides security against chosen ciphertext attacks at no extra cost in terms of
number of operations or key lengths [11]. Together with other proposals, DHIES was employed
in the preparation of standards [13,14].
Finally, it is worth mentioning the so-called ECIES (Elliptic Curve Integrated Encryption Scheme),
which embraces several integrated ciphering schemes using DHIES-based elliptic curves and it is
described in the relevant security standards, such as [13–15] (a comparison among different ECIES
implementations may be found in [16]). Remark that, whenever ECIES is recommended (even with
minor differences regarding implementations), it is to be used in a hybrid setting, where a (DH-type)
session key agreement protocol is a must.
Setting aside the already mentioned cryptosystems and key-agreement protocols, it is probably in
digital signature schemes that elliptic curve cryptography is mostly demanded. The ElGamal-based
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is analogous to the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) [17], using additive rather than multiplicative notation. ECDSA has consolidated into an
internationally accepted standard [13,18].
When dealing with ECC, one of the most important aspects to keep in mind is the processes of
curve generation and selection. Several standards tackle such methods and show examples of curve
selection as part of the public-key generation process. Among them, it is worth mentioning X9.63 [13],
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IEEE 1363 [19], and FIPS 186-4 [20], issued by the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) of the USA. However, in practice, such standards lack precision and clarity when it comes to
selecting seeds for random generation, or prime numbers, thus limiting the ability of serving really
practical purposes.
For these reasons, several initiatives have ripened, such as Brainpool [21], considered to be
the first international proposal to provide clear and transparent procedures in order to generate the
parameters of elliptic curves for cryptographic purposes. Under the Brainpool initiative, several elliptic
curves, presented in reduced Weierstrass format, have been considered safe beyond any doubt by
many experts.
Later on, researchers Daniel Bernstein and Tania Lange [22] reviewed the elliptic curve generation
procedures, including those in Brainpool. In particular, they scrutinized 20 curves from several
sources under a number of security requirements that they considered a must. The result was that
just only Edwards and Montgomery curves [23] satisfied those requirements. In view of this outcome,
the experts decided to propose a new set of curves, known as SafeCurves that really met the set of safety
requirements [22]. Moreover, Baignères [24] proposed a new Edwards elliptic curve (the so-called
million dollar curve) by means of a new technique that insists in the randomness of the input parameters
to the generation process.
In spite of those efforts, the currently most deployed elliptic curves, both in hardware and
software implementations, are those presented in the reduced Weierstrass format, whereas Edwards or
Montgomery curves are seldom used, maybe because the additional security provided by them is not
worth their lower computation efficiency (multiplications with scalars). A performance comparison
among the three types of curves cited above can be found in [25]. In the latter, the authors resorted to
the examples provided by the initiative SafeCurves, together with a Java implementation developed
by them.
Koyama et al. proposed in [26] the use of elliptic curves over the ring Zn, where n is an odd
composite square-free integer. In particular, n is the product of two large primes, as in the RSA
cryptosystem. The security of the cryptosystem of Koyama et al.’s is based upon IFP, though the
authors did not prove whether solving the IFP was equivalent to breaking their cryptosystem. Later
on, Meyer and Müller proved in [27] that breaking a modified version of Koyama’s cryptosystem was
indeed equivalent to factorizing n. In addition, they proposed a digital signature scheme based on
elliptic curves defined over Zn.
Another interesting question is the ever growing necessity of implementing elliptic curve
cryptography on ubiquitous portable devices (smartphones, smart cards, pen-drives, and the like),
which gives rise to new challenges. Actually, these devices normally present severe limitations
regarding storage capacity or processing power, as compared with ordinary desktop computers.
Elliptic curve cryptography is amenable to these devices since key sizes are much smaller than in other
cryptosystems (for example, RSA) for similar security levels.
It is very common nowadays to find elliptic curve cryptography on such devices, and hence
implementations of multiplication operations. These operations, in turn, are threatened by the ever
more powerful side channel and fault injection attacks. For example, Reference [28] documents recent
developments on those side channel attacks to ECC implementations. It is completely necessary
to implement the multiplication algorithms in such a way that they do not leak any information to
possible attackers. Reference [29] describes some options to avoid such attacks when implementing
scalar multiplications for elliptic curves.
It is also very well known that the advent of a universal quantum computer with sufficient
computation power could break the most commonly used asymmetric cryptosystems. In fact, Shor’s
algorithm [30], proposed in 1997, is known to solve IFP and DLP (or ECDLP) in polynomial time if
such quantum computer does exist; however, there is no agreement as to how many qubits would be
required to execute Shor’s or other quantum algorithms, but some estimations point to a number of
qubits several orders of magnitude larger than the number of qubits available in currently existing
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quantum computers [31]. Should such number of qubits be available, IFP or DLP could be solved
in a bunch of hours. For example, a personal computer needs, roughly speaking, O
(
2
3
√
log n
)
bit
operations to factor a number n, whereas a quantum computer executing Shor’s algorithm could
perform such factorization with only O
(
log3 n
)
bit operations and using O(log n) bit storage.
Though it seems that a quantum computer with the required computation power will not be
available any time soon, the new source of attacks coming from quantum world and the need to
ensure that the information protected by current asymmetric systems continues to be accessible forced
the NIST to launch an international call [32] for new cryptographic algorithms resilient to the power
leveraged by quantum computation: the so-called quantum-resistant algorithms. These are expected
to cover at least proposals for new asymmetric encryption schemes, digital signature schemes, and key
encapsulation mechanisms (KEM). The main quantum-resistant proposals include difficult problems
stemming from coding theory, lattices, hash functions, and isogenies over elliptic curves, to mention
just a few. In January 2019, the NIST published the list of submitted algorithms that have passed on to
the second round of the call [33]. Among them, there stands the proposal SIKE as a key encapsulation
mechanism that is based on isogenies over elliptic curves.
The previous paragraphs summarize the current state of affairs regarding classic and quantum
cryptography and make it clear that there is much to be done in both classic and quantum worlds.
Taking that current context into account, this work presents a new group law defined on a subset
of the projective plane FP2 over an arbitrary field F, which lends itself to applications in public key
cryptography. Apart from the mathematical novelty implied, this new group law presents several
features worth public key cryptosystems, such as:
• a Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement, since such protocol remains a basic piece for any hybrid
cryptosystem, as commented above.
• an extension to the ring Zpq providing enhanced security, following the same vein as the one
followed by [26,27].
• no side channel attacks known to date, given the recentness of this proposal and due to the
particular group law defined.
• gives rise to new research lines, such as defining isogenies over the group structure, thus opening
the path to a possibly new quantum-resistant problem.
In a nutshell, the main contribution of this paper is to propose a new group law, defined on the
complement of a projective cubic plane curve, prove its properties, and consider the possibility of using
it as a building block for cryptographic applications in the field of Public Key Cryptography (PKC).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the group law and its main characteristics
and properties. In particular, we define the mathematical problem associated with the considered
group law, and we give the explicit formulas to compute the group operation of any two elements of
the group. These formulas, which involve coefficients from the base field, are applicable to any pair
of elements of the group with no exception whatsoever, which is advantageous in view of possible
cryptographic applications, since this feature helps, for example, to withstand side channel attacks.
As an application of the defined group law to PKC, a cryptographic protocol, in particular,
a Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement protocol, is defined in Section 3. We also analyze the
computational difficulty of solving the mathematical problem underlying the defined group law,
and we prove that the hardness of our problem is equivalent to that of the discrete logarithm problem
on the multiplicative group of the cubic extension of the finite field considered.
In Section 4, we consider an entirely analogous system, but shifting the general base field to the
ring Z/pqZ. We make it clear that this last proposal enhances the security of the system, since it now
depends not only on DLP but also on the factorization problem, though at the price of doubling the
key length.
The last section is devoted to the conclusions.
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2. The Group Law Defined
Our purpose in this section is to search for a particular (finite) group endowed with an internal
operation that makes it cyclic provided that certain conditions hold. In the latter case, we define yet
another (discrete) logarithm operation, which, if found to be difficult to carry out, may give rise to
cryptographic applications.
We will work with three-dimensional vector spaces and their associated two-dimensional
projective spaces, defined over finite fields. We will consider certain cubic curve defined over this
ambient projective space, so that the set over which we will define our new group operation is precisely
the set of points of the projective space that do not belong to that cubic curve.
We will show the conditions under which the cubic curve has no points in the projective space,
which means that the group embraces the the full projective space. We will provide the explicit
formulas to compute the group law in the base field and the good piece of news is that these formulas
are the same for any of the elements in the group, a feature much cherished in cryptographic settings.
Let F be a field and let us consider a linear endomorphism A : V → V of the vector space V = F3.
We define the polynomial Q(x) = det(x1 I + x2 A + x3 A2), where x = (x1, x2, x3) ∈ V. The polynomial
Q is homogeneous of degree 3, and does not depend on A, but only on the characteristic polynomial
χ(X) of A.
A new group law is proposed ⊕ : V × V → V. Let the multiplicative group F∗ act on V by
the diagonal action, i.e., λ · (x1, x2, x3) = (λx1,λx2,λx3), and let FP2 denote the projective plane,
namely FP2 = (V \ {(0, 0, 0)})/F∗. Then, the proposed group law induces an Abelian group law on
FP2 \Q−1(0).
If the characteristic polynomial χ(X) is irreducible in F[X], then Q−1(0) = {(0, 0, 0)},
and therefore the group law extends to the whole projective plane FP2; moreover, if the base field is
a finite field Fq, with characteristic different from 2 or 3, then the group G = (FqP2,⊕) is proved to
be cyclic.
The latter property permits us to apply the notion of discrete logarithm to the group G. If we fix a
generator g ∈ FqP2, then any element h of the group is the addition of g with itself a finite number
of times, say n, so that h = g⊕ g⊕ (n)· · · ⊕ g = [n]g. The number n is the logarithm of h to the base g.
Given any element h ∈ G, and a generator g of the group, the discrete logarithm problem (DLP)
consists of finding the smallest integer n, such that h = [n]g. In this work, we prove that the DLP over
G with a proper choice of the generator is equivalent to the DLP over the multiplicative group (Fq3)∗.
Popular current cryptosystems are based on the discrete logarithm problem over different groups,
such as the group of invertible elements in a finite field, or the group of points of an elliptic curve with
the addition of points as group operation. Our proposal could fit perfectly well in the same niche.
As is the case for analogous public key protocols, the users of the present proposal agree to a
single base field Fq and an (irreducible) polynomial:
χ(X) = X3 − c1X2 − c2X− c3, c1, c2, c3 ∈ Fq.
The public system parameters include the base field Fq, coefficients c1, c2, c3 ∈ Fq, and a generator g.
Next, we prove that the polynomial Q does not depend on A, but only on the characteristic
polynomial χ(X) of A.
Lemma 1. Let F be a field and let V be the vector space F3. If A : V → V is a linear map such that the
endomorphisms I, A, A2 are linearly independent, then the homogeneous cubic polynomial Q(x) = det(x1 I +
x2 A + x3 A2) does not depend on the matrix A but only on the coefficients c1, c2, c3 of its characteristic
polynomial χ(X) = X3 − c1X2 − c2X− c3.
Proof. Let F¯ be the algebraic closure of F. As the endomorphisms I, A, A2 are linearly independent,
the annihilator polynomial of A coincides with χ(X) by virtue of the Cayley-Hamilton theorem.
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Hence, there exists a basis of F¯3 such that the matrix of A in this basis equals one of the following
three matrices:
M1 =
 α1 0 00 α2 0
0 0 α3
 , M2 =
 α1 0 00 α2 0
0 1 α2
 , M3 =
 α1 0 01 α1 0
0 1 α1
 , (1)
and, from a simple calculation, we obtain
Q(x) = det(x1 I + x2Mi + x3(Mi)2)
= −c2x1(x2)2 +
[
(c2)2 − 2(c1c3)
]
x1(x3)2 + c1(x1)2x2
+
[
(c1)2 + 2c2
]
(x1)2x3 − (c2c3)x2(x3)2 + (c1c3)(x2)2x3
− (c1c2 + 3c3) x1x2x3 + (x1)3 + c3(x2)3 + (c3)2(x3)3,
(2)
for every i = 1, 2, 3.
Theorem 1. Every linear map A : V → V such that the endomorphisms I, A, A2 are linearly independent,
induces a law of composition
⊕ : V ×V → V,
(x, y) 7→ z = x⊕ y,
by the following formula:
z1 I + z2 A + z3 A2 =
(
x1 I + x2 A + x3 A2
) (
y1 I + y2 A + y3 A2
)
, (3)
where x = (x1, x2, x3), y = (y1, y2, y3), z = (z1, z2, z3).
Moreover, the set of elements x ∈ V such that x⊕ y = (0, 0, 0) for some element y in V \ {(0, 0, 0)}
coincides with the set Q−1(0), and ⊕ induces a group law
⊕ : (F3 \Q−1(0))× (F3 \Q−1(0))→ (F3 \Q−1(0)).
If C denotes the projective cubic curve defined by Q(x) = 0, then the group law ⊕ also induces a group law
⊕ : (FP2 \ C)× (FP2 \ C)→ FP2 \ C.
Proof. As A3 = c1 A2 + c2 A + c3 I, and
A2 · A2 = A · A3
= (c1c3) I + (c1c2 + c3) A +
[
(c1)2 + c2
]
A2,
from the formula in (3), it follows:
z1 = x1y1 + c3 (x2y3 + x3y2) + (c1c3) x3y3,
z2 = x1y2 + x2y1 + c2 (x2y3 + x3y2) + (c1c2 + c3) x3y3,
z3 = x2y2 + x1y3 + x3y1 + c1 (x2y3 + x3y2) +
(
(c1)2 + c2
)
x3y3.
(4)
In matrix notation, these formulas can equivalently be written as z1z2
z3
 =
 x1 c3x3 c1c3x3 + c3x2x2 x1 + c2x3 c2x2 + c3x3 + c1c2x3
x3 x2 + c1x3 x1 + (c1)2x3 + c1x2 + c2x3

 y1y2
y3
 ,
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and as a simple computation shows, the determinant of the linear system above is equal to Q(x), where
Q is defined by the formula (2). Hence, x⊕ y = (0, 0, 0), for some y in V \ {(0, 0, 0)}, if and only if
Q(x) = 0.
The commutativity of ⊕ is a direct consequence of the invariance of the formula (4) under the
substitutions xi 7→ yi, yi 7→ xi, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Moreover, formula (3) can also be written as follows:
(x⊕ y)1 I + (x⊕ y)2 A + (x⊕ y)3 A2 =
(
x1 I + x2 A + x3 A2
) (
y1 I + y2 A + y3 A2
)
.
From the associativity of the composition law of endomorphisms, we deduce
(x⊕ (y⊕ z))1 I + (x⊕ (y⊕ z))2 A + (x⊕ (y⊕ z))3 A2
=
(
x1 I + x2 A + x3 A2
) · ((y1 I + y2 A + y3 A2) · (z1 I + z2 A + z3 A2))
=
((
x1 I + x2 A + x3 A2
) · (y1 I + y2 A + y3 A2)) · (z1 I + z2 A + z3 A2)
= ((x⊕ y)⊕ z)1 I + ((x⊕ y)⊕ z)2 A + ((x⊕ y)⊕ z)3 A2.
Hence, x⊕ (y⊕ z) = (x⊕ y)⊕ z, ∀x, y, z ∈ V.
From Equation (4), it follows that the unit element is the point (1, 0, 0), which does not belong to
Q−1(0) since Q(1, 0, 0) = 1.
By taking determinants in Equation (3), we obtain
Q(x⊕ y) = Q(x)Q(y), ∀x, y ∈ V.
Therefore, the opposite element y of x exists and it is given by the following formulas:
y1 = 1Q(x)
(
c1x1x2 +
[
(c1)2 + 2c2
]
x1x3 − (c3 + c1c2) x2x3 + (x1)2 − c2(x2)2 +
[
(c2)2 − c1c3
]
(x3)2
)
,
y2 = −1Q(x)
(
x1x2 + (c1)2x2x3 + c1(x2)2 − (c1c2 + c3) (x3)2
)
,
y3 = 1Q(x)
(−x1x3 + c1x2x3 + (x2)2 − c2(x3)2) .
Finally, if x, y are replaced by λx, µy, respectively, with λ, µ ∈ F∗, then z transforms into λµz,
thus proving that the group law projects onto FP2 \ C.
Remark 1. Note that the Equations (4), allowing one to compute the ⊕ group operation in terms of the
coefficients in the ground field, are applicable to any element of the group, with no exception at all.
Remark 2. If v1 = (1, 0, 0), v2 = (0, 1, 0), v3 = (0, 0, 1), then, from Equation (2), we obtain Q(v2) = c3,
Q(v3) = (c3)2. Hence, v2 and v3 belong to F3 \Q−1(0) if and only if c3 6= 0, i.e., when A is invertible.
2.1. The Basic Cubic
Proposition 1. Let χ(X) = X3 − c1X2 − c2X − c3 ∈ F[X] be the polynomial introduced in Lemma 1 and
let α = X mod χ. If N : F[α]→ F is the norm of the extension F[α] of F, then a point β = β0 + β1α+ β2α2
belongs to the cubic curve C defined in Theorem 1 if and only if N(β) = 0. In particular, if χ is irreducible in
F[X], then C has no point in FP2.
Proof. Every β ∈ F[α] induces an F-linear endomorphism Eβ : F[α] → F[α] given by Eβ(ξ) = β · ξ,
∀ξ ∈ F[α], and, from the very definition of the norm, we have N(β) = det Eβ. As a computation shows,
we obtain N(β) = Q(β0, β1, β2), thus proving the first part of the statement.
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Moreover, χ is irreducible if and only if F[α] is a field, and then the only element with norm 0 is in
fact 0 ∈ F[α]. To see this, assume on the contrary that N(x) = 0, with x 6= 0 and x ∈ F[α]. Since the
norm is a group homomorphism, we can write
1 = N(1) = N(x · x−1) = N(x) · N(x−1) = 0 · N(x−1) = 0,
which is a contradiction. Consequently, the curve C has no point in FP2.
Corollary 1. The polynomial χ is irreducible in F[X] if and only if the cubic C is irreducible.
Proof. Actually, if χ factors in F[X], say X3− c1X2− c2X− c3 = (X− h)(X2 + kX + l), with h, k, l ∈ F,
then we have
Q(x) = [(x1)2 + (k2 − 2l)x1x3 + l(x2)2 − klx2x3 + l2(x3)2 − kx1x2][x1 + hx2 + h2x3].
Conversely, if χ is irreducible in F[X], then, according to the second part of Proposition 1, the only
solution to the cubic equation Q(x) = 0 is x = 0. Hence, Q must be irreducible, as a reducible cubic
admits non-trivial solutions in the ground field.
Corollary 2. If the characteristic polynomial χ of A is irreducible in F[X], then there is no linear transformation
(λij)
3
i,j=1 ∈ GL(F, 3) reducing the polynomial Q defined in (2) to Weierstrass form.
Proof. Replacing xj by Xj = ∑3i=1 λijxi, 1 ≤ j ≤ 3, in (2), we obtain a cubic Q¯, which is in Weierstrass
form (see [34] [§2.1]) if and only if the coefficients a, b, and c of the terms (x3)3, (x1)2x2, and x1(x2)2,
respectively, vanish. As a computation shows, we have a = Q¯(λ31,λ32,λ33), and we can conclude by
applying Proposition 1.
2.2. Cyclicity
Theorem 2. If Fq is a finite field of characteristic different from 2 or 3 and the polynomial χ(X) = X3 −
c1X2 − c2X− c3 introduced in Lemma 1 is irreducible in Fq[X], then the group G = (FqP2,⊕) is cyclic.
Proof. Since charFq 6= 2, 3, the polynomial χ is separable and in its splitting field F′q we have χ(X) =
(X− α1)(X− α2)(X− α3), the roots α1, α2, α3 being pairwise distinct, and in a certain basis of F′q⊗Fq V
the matrix of A is given by the formula (1). As the Galois group G(F′q/Fq) acts transitively on the roots
of χ, there exist two automorphisms such that σ2(α1) = α2 and σ3(α1) = α3. If β = β1 + β2α1 + β3(α1)2,
βi ∈ Fq, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3, is an element in Fq[α1] ∼= Fq3 , then, for every positive integer n, we have
(
β1 I + β2 A + β3 A2
)n
=
 βn 0 00 σ2 (βn) 0
0 0 σ3 (βn)
 .
Consequently, if β is a generator of the multiplicative group (Fq3)∗, then the vector (β1, β2, β3)
generates the group ((Fq)3 \ {(0, 0, 0)},⊕) and its corresponding projective point [β1, β2, β3] =
(β1, β2, β3) mod F∗q generates the group G, with FqP2 =
(
(Fq)3 \ {(0, 0, 0)}
)
/F∗q .
Remark 3. It is important to keep in mind that the implication in Theorem 2 works only in the way in which it
is worded. If one selects a generator of the group G, it will in general be a generator of only a subgroup of the
whole (Fq3)∗ group. Consequently, when choosing a generator for G, it is convenient to pick it from the set of
generators in (Fq3)∗ and, after that, project it onto FqP2.
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Remark 4. As the order of the group G = (FqP2,⊕) is q2 + q + 1, the statement of Theorem 2 means that
there exists an element β ∈ G of order q2 + q + 1. According to the proof of Theorem 2, this is equivalent to
saying that the matrix A in (1) is of order q2 + q + 1 in the linear group GL(Fq, 3). A classical result (see [35]
[Theorem, p. 379]) states that such a collineation always exists, but we need a direct proof of this fact to be able to
apply it below in Section 3.1; see also [36] [Proposition 2.1].
Remark 5. When the polynomial χ is reducible, experimental tests carried out in the prime field Fp show that the
projective cubic curve C defined as Q(x) = 0 has a number of points from the set {p+ 2, 2p+ 1, 3p, p+ 1} only.
Since the projective space FpP2 has a total of p2 + p+ 1 points, the group (FpP2 \C,⊕) is left, respectively,
with {p2 − 1, p2 − p, (p− 1)2, p2} points.
If the number of points of C is either p + 2 or 2p + 1, then the group (FpP2 \ C,⊕) is still cyclic, and
has the expected number of generators, namely, either ϕ(p2 − 1) or ϕ(p2 − p), respectively, where ϕ is Euler’s
totient function.
However, none of the other two possibilities give rise to a cyclic group. Rather, for the case where C has 3p
points, there appears a number of cyclic groups, whose cardinalities are the divisors of p− 1; it is important to
remark that the total number of points left for the group is precisely (p− 1)2. Thus, the group (FpP2 \ C,⊕)
can be decomposed as a direct sum of a number of cyclic groups such that the product of their cardinalities is
(p− 1)2.
As for the case when C has p+ 1 points, the group (FpP2 \C,⊕) is not cyclic either and can be decomposed
as a direct sum of 2 cyclic groups with p points each. Remark that now the total number of points left for the
group is p2, so again the numbers of points of the cyclic groups of this case match the divisors of p.
Remark 6. Hasse’s theorem states [37] [Theorem 4.1] that the number of points in an elliptic curve E(Fq)
verifies that |#E(Fq)− (q + 1)| ≤ 2√q, i.e., #E(Fq) = O(q). However, the projective space in our proposal
has O(q2) points, thus rendering brute-force and known-message attacks much more difficult.
3. A Cryptographic Protocol
We have presented the group G = (FqP2,⊕) and the conditions under which it is cyclic.
In this section, we will show how this group can be profited as a basic building block for cryptographic
applications, and we will assess its cryptographic security level.
We resort to current state-of-the-art algorithms deployed to attack the discrete logarithm problem.
Among them, index-calculus algorithm stands out since it displays a subexponential expected
running time.
Equipped with these tools, we will show how this group permits us to set up a basic, à la
Diffie-Hellman, key-exchange protocol, and what cryptographic security is to be expected from it.
Actually, we will present the range in which the protocol setup parameters should lie in order to
achieve a certain security level.
We also provide an experimental setup that we have carried out in order to obtain computation
times for the new group operation on a real setting, along with a comparison with computation times
required to sum points on elliptic curves.
First of all, we establish the computational security of the mathematical problem defined over
the cyclic group considered. Later on, as an example of cryptographic protocol, we present a
Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement protocol.
3.1. Equivalence of DLP in G and (Fq3)∗
Proposition 2. Let Fq be a finite field of characteristic 6= 2 or 3. Assume the polynomial χ(X) = X3− c1X2−
c2X− c3 in Lemma 1 is irreducible in Fq[X], and let α ∈ Fq3 be a root of χ.
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If (γ1,γ2,γ3) is a generator of the group ((Fq)3 \ {(0, 0, 0)},⊕) and (β1, β2, β3) belongs to this group,
then n ∈ N is a solution to the equation
(β1, β2, β3) = (γ1,γ2,γ3)⊕ (n). . .⊕ (γ1,γ2,γ3) ,
if and only if n is a solution to the equation β = γn in the multiplicative group (Fq3)∗, where β = β1 + β2α+
β3α
2, and γ = γ1 + γ2α+ γ3α2.
Therefore, the DLP in the group ((Fq)3 \ {(0, 0, 0)},⊕) is equivalent to the DLP in (Fq3)∗.
Proof. Letting α = α1, the statement follows from the matrix formula in the proof of Theorem 2 taking
the very definition of the group law ⊕ by formula (3) into account.
In the present case, Proposition 2 states the “equivalence” because the reduction of problems (see,
for example, [38] [p. 5], [39] [Ch. 8]) works both ways, namely, DLP in the group ((Fq)3 \ {(0, 0, 0)},⊕)
reduces to the DLP in (Fq3)∗ and the other way around. Hence, Proposition 2 proves that the use of
the group G = (FqP2,⊕) is safe for standard implementations in PKC (e.g., see [34] [§1.6]), since the
security it provides is equivalent to that of DLP in (Fq3)∗, as long as the caveat stated in Remark 3 is
taken into account.
In terms of cryptanalysis, logarithms in G can be computed using “generic” algorithms, i.e., those
that assume no particular structure in (or extra knowledge of) the group. The most popular ones
are Pohlig-Hellman (which reduces the computation in the whole group to the computation of the
logarithm in all subgroups of prime order of G), Shank’s Baby Step/Giant Step, and Pollard’s Rho
algorithm. All of them need an exponential computation time.
However, there exists the so-called index-calculus algorithm, which is much faster as it is able to
compute discrete logarithms in the multiplicative group of a finite field in subexponential time (see,
e.g., [40]). Since the operations in the proposed group G = (FqP2,⊕) can be efficiently transferred to
those in (Fq3)∗, it follows that index-calculus algorithm can be applied to the multiplicative group of
the latter. This fact does not render the group operation automatically useless in the face of possible
cryptographic applications, as long as proper key lengths are utilized.
For general finite fields, such as the proposed one, with a multiplicative group of size N, current
state-of-the-art algorithms (including index-calculus) report computation times of
LN(α, c) = exp
(
(c + o(1))(log N)α(log log N)1−α
)
, (5)
where α and c are parameters in the ranges 0 < α < 1 and c > 0 (sometimes c is omitted and we default
to LN(α)). Actually, α drives the transition from an exponential-time algorithm (when α approaches 1)
to a pure polynomial-time algorithm (as α tends to 0).
The first subexponential algorithms had complexity LN(1/2) and applied only to prime fields.
Soon LN(1/3) was achieved for any finite field, with values for c ranging from (64/3)1/3 for fields with
high characteristic to (128/9)1/3 for medium characteristic. When dealing with small characteristic
fields, recent research brought down the complexity to LN(1/4) [41] and even to quasi-polynomial
time [42,43]. If the group size is N = pn, and we write p = Lpn(lp), then the characteristic is considered
“small”, “medium-sized” or “large” depending on whether lp ≤ 1/3, 1/3 < lp < 2/3, or lp ≥ 2/3,
respectively.
In any case, the previous results have been applied in practice and several cryptanalysis have
been successfully carried out (see [44,45]), so it seems sensible to avoid using small characteristics and
also extensions of moderate characteristic included in the range threatened by recent cryptanalytic
techniques [42,43,46]. However, these algorithms are heuristic and are proved to work only for certain
particular cases, not difficult to circumvent: for example, if one has N = pn, it suffices to choose both p
and n to be prime in order to thwart both [42,43]. For a detailed account of history and current status,
see [47] (in particular §4.2), and [48].
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Our proposal is to use a group G of prime order n = q2 + q + 1, over a ground field Fq.
Using formula (5), we can compute how many elements in G provide a given security level. Since
the number of elements is roughly the square of the value of q, it follows that q can be represented
with only one half of the bits needed for n. This has a direct impact on the computation time of the ⊕
operation in G, since it is performed in Fq (see Equation (4) and cost analysis in Section 3.4).
3.2. System Setup and System Parameters for a Key Agreement Protocol
The group G = (FqP2,⊕) lends readily itself as a building block for standard cryptographic
applications to be constructed upon it. One of such applications is a Diffie-Hellman-like key agreement
protocol, which will be described in the following sections.
In the sequel, we provide the necessary steps to set up the system. Moreover, the users also need
to fix some system parameters.
System Setup
To set up the system, the following steps are in order:
1. Choose a ground field Fq with characteristic different from 2 or 3, such that ` = q2 + q+ 1 is prime.
2. Select elements c1, c2, c3 ∈ Fq such that the polynomial
χ(X) = X3 − c1X2 − c2X− c3
is irreducible in Fq[X].
3. Consider Fq3 ' Fq[X]/(χ(X)). Select α ∈ (Fq3)∗ such that it is a generator of (Fq3)∗.
4. Compute the coordinates of α seen as a vector over Fq, which will be denoted as (α1, α2, α3) ∈
(Fq)3 \ {(0, 0, 0)}.
5. Consider a projection pi : (Fq)3 \ {(0, 0, 0)} → FqP2, such that [β1, β2, β3] = pi(α1, α2, α3), and
Q(β1, β2, β3) = 1.
Observe that N(α) = Q(α1, α2, α3) (see proof of Proposition 1). If we compute a = N(α)−e, where
e = 3−1 (mod q− 1), we have that N(aα) = 1. Therefore, the projection pi consists simply in
computing βi = aαi, for 1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
Defining the projection pi in this way is convenient, since it automatically gives rise to a generator
in FqP2 with a unitary norm, which means that all the elements generated by it will enjoy also a
unitary norm.
Remark en passant that the previous device works only if 3 is invertible in Zq−1. Fortunately,
this is always the case since otherwise the following implications hold: 3|(q − 1) ⇒ q ≡ 1
(mod 3)⇒ ` = q2 + q + 1 ≡ 0 (mod 3) and the latter equation would contradict the fact that we
chose ` as a prime.
Remark 7. In order to save space, we can always find an irreducible χ such that c1 = 0. Obviously, c3 cannot
be 0, but we may wonder whether we could in addition take c2 = 0. However, this is not possible according
to [49] (Lemma 7). The latter reference studies the number of irreducible binomials Xt− a ∈ Fq[X], with a ∈ F∗q ,
and concludes that the number of such irreducible binomials Nt(q) is
Nt(q) =
{
ϕ(t)
t (q− 1), if rad4(t)|(q− 1),
0, otherwise.
The largest square-free number that divides t 6= 0 is denoted by rad(t) and
rad4(t) =
{
rad(t) if 4 6 |t
2rad(t) otherwise.
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For our case, t = 3, hence rad4(t) = 3. However, then Nt(q) = 0, since we chose ` = q2 + q + 1 to be a
prime, thus implying 3 6 |(q− 1).
Accordingly, we conclude that c1 and c2 cannot be simultaneously taken as 0.
System Parameters
The system parameters are defined by the set S = {Fq, [β1, β2, β3], c1, c2, c3}, following the
notation and conditions explained above.
3.3. The Key Agreement Protocol
The key agreement follows the well-known Diffie-Hellman paradigm. Any two users A, B, willing
to agree on a common value, which remains secret, set up a system and agree on its parameters, as
stated previously.
The protocol runs as follows:
1. User A selects nA ∈ Z` uniformly at random, with ` = q2 + q + 1, computes
[γA1 ,γ
A
2 ,γ
A
3 ] = ⊕nA [β1, β2, β3] ∈ FqP2
and sends it to user B.
2. User B selects nB ∈ Z` uniformly at random, computes
[γB1 ,γ
B
2 ,γ
B
3 ] = ⊕nB [β1, β2, β3] ∈ FqP2
and sends it to user A.
3. User A computes kA = ⊕nA [γB1 ,γB2 ,γB3 ].
4. User B computes kB = ⊕nB [γA1 ,γA2 ,γA3 ].
According to the definitions, the following equalities clearly hold:
kA = ⊕nA [γB1 ,γB2 ,γB3 ] = ⊕nA (⊕nB [β1, β2, β3])
= ⊕nB (⊕nA [β1, β2, β3])
= ⊕nB [γA1 ,γA2 ,γA3 ] = kB.
Hence, the properties of the operation ⊕ in G ensure that actually kA = kB, which is the common
value expected as the output of the protocol.
3.4. Cost of the ⊕ Operation in G
Let S and P be the number of field operations in order to perform an addition and a multiplication
respectively in Fq. From the formula (4), it follows that the total number of operations for computing
x ⊕ y is equal to 10S + 15P, once the 2S + 3P precomputations of c1c3, c1c2 + c3, and (c1)2 + c2
are assumed.
3.5. A Toy Example
We provide hereafter an example of computing a discrete logarithm by brute-force search.
In general, this algorithm is, of course, infeasible, but we choose very small parameters in order
to illustrate the operation of the group G.
Let us take the prime field Fp, with p = 131, for which p2 + p + 1 = 17,293 is also a prime.
Accordingly, the group G is cyclic. We set the parameters c1 = 13, c2 = 18, c3 = 73, since the
polynomial χ(X) = X3 − 13X2 − 18X− 73 is irreducible in F131.
Mathematics 2020, 8, 734 13 of 20
We select the element x = (126, 16, 1) as a generator in (F3q)∗. As explained above, it is convenient
to project it onto a unitary norm point of FqP2. To achieve this goal, we perform the following steps:
N(x) = Q(126, 16, 1) = 90,
e = 3−1 (mod 130) = 87,
a = 1/N(x)e = 23,
X = pi(x) = a · (126, 16, 1) = [16, 106, 23].
Observe that indeed Q(16, 106, 23) = 1. We choose a target point y = (86, 120, 1) and performing
a similar computation we get Y = [15, 91, 87]. The problem is to find the discrete logarithm of Y
to the base X, i.e., find the integer n such that Y = ⊕nX. Iterating the operation, we carry out an
exhaustive search:
[16, 106, 23]→ [44, 78, 53]→ [65, 41, 125]→ [40, 50, 43]→
[35, 67, 125]→ [115, 59, 58]→ [11, 95, 6]→ [8, 69, 62]→
[122, 109, 9]→ [15, 91, 87].
Eventually, we come up with the target point. Since the operation has been iterated ten times,
we conclude Y = ⊕10X for this particular pair, so that logX Y = 10. Remark that, to perform each step,
it suffices to follow the formula (4).
3.6. Experimental Results
We have conducted several experiments in order to assess the computation time of the⊕ operation
in G. The basic setup consists of selecting prime fields, Fp, over which the ⊕ operation will be tested.
Observe that, according to formula (4), performing the operation boils down to a number of additions
and multiplications over the base field; hence, the expected computation time will depend on the
size of its elements; informally, size (also known as bit length) means the number of bits in the binary
representation of such elements. The selected prime fields, Fp, will have increasing values for the size
of p, i.e., increasing bit lengths in the representation of their elements.
Taking the previous considerations into account the experiment is conducted as follows: we take
increasing values of p and, for each value, we perform all the required computations to add two
random points in G, following formula (4). We repeat the experiment a large number of times for
distinct points and record the mean computation time for each value of p.
In order to compare computation times, we repeated the same experiment for the point addition
in elliptic curves over Fp, using the same range of bit lengths. As before, the idea is selecting
random points and adding them using, in particular, projective coordinates according to the formulas
given in [50] [§13.2.1.b]. Repeating the computation a large number of times, we record the mean
computation time for each value of p. Choosing the point addition operation in elliptic curves as the
term of comparison with the ⊕ operation seems sensible since both operations share a relatively large
number of basic operations (namely, additions, multiplications, and inversions) in the ground field.
We implemented the experiments using Java SE Runtime Environment version 1.8.0_171-b11 and
the execution was carried out on an Intel Core i7-4790 platform (Santa Clara, CA, USA) running at
3.60 GHz. We performed the experiment in the range 32–512 bits in steps of 32 bits.
The experiments yielded the results shown in Table 1. In each line, the first column represents the
number of bits of the binary representation of the elements in Fp, the ground field. The second and
third columns represent the mean computation time needed to perform the addition of two points in
the group G via the operation ⊕, and in an elliptic curve over Fp, respectively. All the computation
times are measured in microseconds.
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Table 1. Computation time for one single operation in each setting.
Bit Length ⊕ Operation in G (µs) Point Addition in Elliptic Curves (µs)
32 1.10306044 1.07039673
64 1.68166612 1.97707724
96 1.97807208 2.55200463
128 2.19050201 2.86859037
160 2.52811554 3.35108746
192 2.77264771 3.72361810
224 3.15689638 4.29066712
256 3.36514379 4.65996446
288 3.77635547 5.34568703
320 4.11391404 5.84153419
352 4.60391914 6.43152050
384 4.86727126 6.97227992
416 5.41008866 7.75588654
448 5.77817335 8.32544612
480 6.31956718 9.02521134
512 6.70272949 9.61432718
Having a visual idea of the results reported in Table 1 is best achieved by depicting them in a
combined graph. To this end, we show in Figure 1 the graphical representation of the computation
times for both operations, as reported in Table 1. Both graphs are conveniently labeled so that one of
them depicts the computation time for the⊕ operation inG, and the other one depicts the computation
time for the point addition in elliptic curves over Fp. The x-axis represents the bit length of p common
for both operations.
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Figure 1. Comparison of average computation times for both settings.
The graph pushes to the foreground some interesting remarks:
• The computation times shown in Figure 1 for both settings show a essentially linear growth, which
is convenient in view of practical applications.
• Though the point addition in elliptic curves is slightly slower than the ⊕ operation in G for the
same bit length over the ground field, they keep a rather constant ratio between them, which is
roughly equal to 0.7.
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3.7. Real World Parameters
In order to assess the size for real world parameters, we resort to the recommendations issued
by NIST [51]. These recommendations are based on the knowledge of the execution time of the
best algorithms solving any particular problem. We will reproduce here an excerpt of Table 2 in
that reference, which summarizes the bit sizes for the relevant parameters applicable to our proposal.
Table 2. Comparable cryptographic strengths.
Security Strength Group Order Base Field Size
112 2048 1024
128 3072 1536
192 7680 3840
256 15,360 7680
We explain hereafter the meaning of the columns. To begin with, Security strength represents the
binary logarithm of the estimated time taken by the best known algorithm for solving the problem
(which is proportional to the number of cryptographic operations), thus breaking the cryptosystem.
The center column, labeled as Group order, is related to the group where the cryptosystem is defined;
in our case, it is the projective space FqP2 where Fq is the base field. In particular, each line in this
column represents the binary logarithm of the number of elements in the projective space needed to
achieve the security strength indicated in the leftmost column.
Since we propose that the number of points in the projective space is n = q2 + q+ 1, the base field
size (namely, the binary logarithm of q) is half the size of n, as represented in the rightmost column.
Remark that this is a nice feature, since the multiplication cost in the base field is intimately related to
the size of the latter.
Finally, the public key consists of one projective point. Since we chose unitary norm for such
point, it can be represented with just two elements of the base field. Therefore, public key size is twice
as much as the base field size (it needs twice as many bits).
4. A More Robust System
The security of the cryptosystem proposed in the previous sections can be increased by extending
the theory developed for a field to the case of a unitary commutative ring R.
Essentially, we will stick to the ring Z/mZ, where m = pq is an integer, the product of two primes
of similar size, p and q. We will strain ourselves in order to apply all the concepts developed in
the previous sections to this new setting in an attempt to improve the security and efficiency of the
proposed scheme.
We will manage to obtain the definition of a group law acting over the direct product of two
projective spaces, FpP2 × FqP2. In this new setting, the security is reinforced since an attacker is forced
to sequentially solve an instance of the integer factorization problem and an instance (actually two
instances, but they can be parallelized) of the discrete logarithm problem.
In fact, let M be a free R-module of finite rank and let A : M → M be an R-linear map with
characteristic polynomial χA(X) = det(XI − Λ), X being an indeterminate, I the identity matrix
of order r = rank M, and Λ the matrix of A in an arbitrary basis for M. According to [52] [III, §8,
11.Proposition 20], the Cayley-Hamilton Theorem holds in this setting, namely χA(A) = 0.
Hence, if M = R3 and χA(X) = X3 − c1X2 − c2X− c3, c1, c2, c3 ∈ R, then A3 = c1 A2 + c2 A+ c3 I.
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As above, we can define a degree-3 homogeneous polynomial in R[x1, x2, x3] by setting
Q(x1, x2, x3) = det
(
x1 I + x2Λ+ x3Λ2
)
. As a computation shows, we have
Q(x1, x2, x3) = −c2x1(x2)2 +
[
(c2)2 − 2(c1c3)
]
x1(x3)2 + c1(x1)2x2
+
[
(c1)2 + 2c2
]
(x1)2x3 − (c2c3)x2(x3)2 + (c1c3)(x2)2x3
− (c1c2 + 3c3) x1x2x3 + (x1)3 + c3(x2)3 + (c3)2(x3)3,
thus proving that Lemma 1 still holds in this case; i.e., Q depends on χA only, but not on the matrix Λ.
The projective plane over R is then defined as follows: RP2 = (R3 \ {0})/R∗, where R∗ denotes
the multiplicative group of invertible elements in R and R∗ acts on R3 \ {0} by
λ · (x1, x2, x3) = (λx1,λx2,λx3), ∀λ ∈ R∗, ∀(x1, x2, x3) ∈ R3 \ {0}.
Proceeding as in the previous sections, a composition law ⊕ : R3 × R3 → R3, (x, y) 7→ z = x⊕ y,
x = (x1, x2, x3), y = (y1, y2, y3), z = (z1, z2, z3), can be defined by the formula
z1 I + z2 A + z3 A2 =
(
x1 I + x2 A + x3 A2
) (
y1 I + y2 A + y3 A2
)
,
and similarly we deduce z1z2
z3
 =
 x1 c3x3 c1c3x3 + c3x2x2 x1 + c2x3 c2x2 + c3x3 + c1c2x3
x3 x2 + c1x3 x1 + (c1)2x3 + c1x2 + c2x3

 y1y2
y3
 . (6)
The determinant of the matrix of (6) is equal to Q(x1, x2, x3). Hence, ⊕ induces a composition
law ⊕ : Q−1(R∗) × Q−1(R∗) → Q−1(R∗). If C denotes the set of classes modulo R∗ of points x ∈
R3 such that Q(x) ∈ R\R∗, then ⊕ also induces a composition law ⊕ : PQ−1(R∗) × PQ−1(R∗) →
PQ−1(R∗), where PQ−1(R∗) = RP2 \ C, as if Q(x) is invertible and λ ∈ R∗, then Q(λx) = λ3Q(x) is
also invertible.
The same proof given in the case of a field shows that the composition law ⊕ is associative,
commutative, and admits an identity element, which is the vector (1, 0, 0).
If m = pq with p 6= q prime integers, then from Chinese Remainder Theorem there is a ring
isomorphism between Z/mZ and the product ring Fp × Fq. Hence, each vector x ∈ R3 can be assigned
a pair (x′, x′′) in (Fp)3 × (Fq)3 and the group (Z/mZ)∗ = (Fp)∗ × (Fq)∗ acts on R3 in the same way as
(Fp)∗ acts on (Fp)3 and (Fq)∗ does on (Fq)3.
Consequently, x 6= 0 if and only if at least one of its two components x′, x′′ is distinct from 0,
so that
R3 \ {0} = [{0} × ((Fq)3 \ {0})] unionsq [((Fp)3 \ {0})× {0}]unionsq[(
(Fp)3 \ {0}
)× ((Fq)3 \ {0})] . (7)
Therefore, (Z/pqZ)P2 = FpP2 unionsq FqP2 unionsq
(
FpP2 × FqP2
)
.
Moreover, letting z = (z′, z′′) = x⊕ y, as a computation shows, one obtains z′ = x′ ⊕ y′ and
z′′ = x′′ ⊕ y′′, and Q(x) is invertible if and only if Q(x)mod p and Q(x)mod q both are invertible
in Z/pZ and Z/qZ, respectively. If x ∈ R3 corresponds to (x′, x′′) in (Fp)3 × (Fq)3, then Q(x) =
(Q′(x′), Q′′(x′′)), where Q′(x′) = det
(
x′1 I + x
′
2Λ
′ + x′3Λ′2
)
, Q′′(x′′) = det
(
x′′1 I + x
′′
2Λ
′′ + x′′3Λ′′2
)
,
and Λ′ = Λmod p, Λ′′ = Λmod q. Hence,
Q−1(R∗) =
{
(x′, x′′) ∈ (Fp)3 × (Fq)3 : Q′(x′) 6= 0, Q′′(x′′) 6= 0
}
. (8)
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We set
χ′(X) = X3 − c′1X2 − c′2X− c′3 ∈ Fp[X], c′i = ci mod p
χ′′(X) = X3 − c′′1 X2 − c′′2 X− c′′3 ∈ Fq[X], c′′i = ci mod q
}
1 ≤ i ≤ 3.
If both χ′ and χ′′ are irreducible polynomials in Fp[X] and Fq[X], respectively, then, according to
Proposition 1, the points of the associated curves C′ and C′′ reduce to the origin; i.e., Q′−1(0) = {0p},
Q′′−1(0) = {0q}, where 0p and 0q denote the origin in (Fp)3 and (Fq)3, respectively.
From (7), taking (8) into account, it follows: PQ−1(R∗) = FpP2 × FqP2. Consequently, we
conclude that PQ−1(R∗) ∼= Sp × Sq, where Sp and Sq are the subgroups given by
Sp = (FpP2 × {(1, 0, 0)},⊕), Sq = ({(1, 0, 0)} × FqP2,⊕),
and, from Theorem 2, we thus obtain
Proposition 3. If the polynomials χ′ and χ′′ are irreducible in Fp[X] and Fq[X], respectively, then the group
(PQ−1(R∗) = FpP2 × FqP2,⊕) is isomorphic to the direct product of the cyclic groups Sp and Sq. Hence,
(PQ−1(R∗),⊕) is cyclic if and only if a = p2 + p + 1 and b = q2 + q + 1 are coprimes; i.e., gcd(a, b) = 1.
Remark 8. If d = gcd(a, b), then a = da′, b = db′, with gcd(a′, b′) = 1. The cyclic subgroup S in
Z/aZ× Z/bZ spanned by (1 mod a, 1 mod b) is of order abd . As d < pq and a = O(p2), b = O(q2), it
follows: abd >
O(p2q2)
pq = O (pq), which indicates that in general the group S is large enough, even if a and b are
not coprimes.
Remark 9. It is clear that the group (PQ−1(R∗),⊕) is also amenable as a building block for a key-agreement
protocol by choosing R = Zm, with m composite. Observe that its security is enhanced with respect to its
counterpart Fq, q a prime power, since the algorithms known to be efficient to compute discrete logarithms only
work in the multiplicative group of a field. This means that one is forced to factorize m in order to apply such
algorithms to the present case, thus increasing the time complexity and the security of the system, though at the
price of doubling the key length.
5. Conclusions
In this work, we have defined a group law, ⊕, over the set FqP2, and considered the discrete
logarithm problem associated with them. We have analyzed their properties and stated the security
of the problem considered. Moreover, based on it, we have defined a cryptographic key agreement
protocol as one possible application of this problem to public key cryptography. Finally, we shift the
system to the group (PQ−1(R∗),⊕) over the ring Z/pqZ, which turns out to be completely analogous
to the previous one and offers an enhanced security, though at the cost of some extra key length.
As future work, we think that it is possible to extend this discrete logarithm problem in order to
define new cryptographic protocols for encryption/decryption and digital signatures, among others,
in a similar way as ElGamal or elliptic curve cryptosystems were defined from the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol.
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